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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents two questions of first impression.
First, we consider whether the general criminal venue
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3238, applies when a defendant
commits part of his offense inside the United States. Second,
we determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) and (f)(1), which
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together criminalize noncommercial illicit sexual conduct
outside the United States, is a valid exercise of Congress‟s
power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United
States Constitution (the Foreign Commerce Clause).
I
On November 25, 2005, Thomas Pendleton boarded a
plane in New York City and flew to Hamburg, Germany. Six
months after his arrival in Germany, Pendleton sexually
molested a fifteen-year-old boy. German authorities arrested
Pendleton, and a jury in Hamburg found him guilty of
“engaging in sexual acts with a person incapable of
resistance.” After serving nineteen months in a German
prison, Pendleton returned to the United States, where he was
arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of
Delaware on one count of engaging in noncommercial illicit
sexual conduct in a foreign place, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2423(c) and (f)(1).
Adopted in 2003 as part of the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
Act (the PROTECT Act), § 2423(c) provides: “Any United
States citizen or alien admitted for permanent residence who
travels in foreign commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.” The statute
defines “illicit sexual conduct” in two ways: (1) “a sexual act
(as defined in section 2246) with a person under 18 years of
age that would be in violation of chapter 109A if the sexual
act occurred in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
of the United States;” or (2) “any commercial sex act (as
defined in section 1591) with a person under 18 years of age.”
18 U.S.C. § 2423(f). Pendleton was indicted under the first
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subpart of § 2423(f), which criminalizes noncommercial sex
with a minor.
Pendleton moved to dismiss the indictment,
challenging Congress‟s authority to regulate noncommercial
activity outside the United States under the Foreign
Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. The District Court denied Pendleton‟s motion,
holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) was a valid exercise of
Congress‟s power to regulate the “channels” of foreign
commerce.1 See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1114
(9th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he phrase „travels in foreign commerce‟
unequivocally establishes that Congress specifically invoked
the Foreign Commerce Clause.”). The District Court also
held that Pendleton‟s due process claim was foreclosed by our
decision in United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F.2d
1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993).2

1

The legislative history of the PROTECT Act does not
include a statement regarding the source of Congress‟s
authority to enact § 2423(c). See generally H.R. REP. NO.
108-66, at 51, reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 686 (Apr.
9, 2003). However, the language of § 2423(c) was adopted
verbatim from an earlier bill—the Sex Tourism Prohibition
Improvement Act of 2002—which relied on the Foreign
Commerce Clause as the basis for its constitutional authority.
See H.R. REP. NO. 525, at 5, 2002 WL 1376220, at *5 (June
24, 2002).
2

Pendleton asks us to reexamine Martinez-Hidalgo‟s
holding that no due process violation occurs when Congress
criminalizes conduct abroad that is “condemned universally
by law-abiding nations.” Id. at 156. We will not do so
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Following a two-day jury trial, Pendleton was
convicted of engaging in illicit sexual conduct in Germany in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c), and he was sentenced to
thirty years in prison.3 At the close of the Government‟s case,
Pendleton moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a), claiming that he should
have been tried in the Eastern District of New York. The
District Court denied the motion, holding that venue was
proper in the District of Delaware because Pendleton was
arrested there following his return to the United States.
United States v. Pendleton, 2010 WL 427230, at *6 (D. Del.
Feb. 2, 2010).

because a panel of this Court has no authority to overrule a
precedential opinion of the Court. See Mariana v. Fisher,
338 F.3d 189, 201 (3d Cir. 2003).
3

Pendleton also was sentenced to a concurrent term of
ten years in prison for failing to register as a sex offender, in
violation of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act
of 2006. See United States v. Pendleton, 636 F.3d 78 (3d Cir.
2011). Pendleton was first convicted of sexually abusing
children in Michigan in 1981 and was sentenced to 24 months
probation. In 1993, a New Jersey jury found Pendleton guilty
of various sex crimes against a 12-year-old boy and he was
sentenced to seven years in prison. About three years after
his release from prison, Pendleton traveled to Latvia and was
convicted there for sex crimes against two children, ages 9
and 13. A little over a year after Pendleton was released from
a Latvian prison he committed the offense at issue in this
case.
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Pendleton timely appealed the District Court‟s
judgment of sentence and seeks reversal for two reasons: (1)
venue was improper in the District of Delaware; and (2) the
“noncommercial” prong of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) is facially
unconstitutional. We consider each argument in turn.
II
Jurisdiction lies over Pendleton‟s appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582, and we exercise plenary
review over the District Court‟s venue determination. United
States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 328-30 (3d Cir. 2002).
As a defendant in a criminal trial, Pendleton has a
constitutional right to be tried in the district where his crime
was committed. Id. at 329 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI and
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3). Congress may fix jurisdiction
in any district where a “crucial element” of the crime is
performed. Id. When Congress has “not indicate[d] where it
consider[s] the place of committing the crime to be,” we
determine jurisdiction “from the nature of the crime alleged
and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” United
States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 279 n.1 (1999)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When the
crime consists of distinct acts occurring in different places,
venue is proper where any part of the crime occurs. Id.
(citing United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 77 (1916)).
Although the PROTECT Act contains no express
venue provision, Pendleton argues that Congress fixed venue
for all crimes involving “transportation in foreign commerce”
only in those districts where foreign travel commenced. For
this proposition, Pendleton cites 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), which
reads in relevant part:
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Any offense involving the use of the mails,
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce,
or the importation of an object or person into
the United States is a continuing offense and,
except as otherwise expressly provided by
enactment of Congress, may be inquired of and
prosecuted in any district from, through, or into
which such commerce, mail matter, or imported
object or person moves.
Because he boarded the plane to Germany in the
Eastern District of New York, Pendleton claimed jurisdiction
would have been proper only in that district. The District
Court disagreed, writing that “the PROTECT Act contains no
directive as to the appropriate venue for the prosecution of
those charged under its provisions.” Consequently, the Court
relied on Rodriguez-Moreno‟s two-pronged approach to
determine venue in this case. Pendleton, 2010 WL 427230, at
*6. This was not error.
Contrary to Pendleton‟s argument, § 3237(a) does not
include a mandatory venue provision. Rather, the statute
instructs that offenses involving interstate or foreign
transportation “may be inquired of and prosecuted . . . in the
district from . . . which such commerce . . . moves.” Id.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the Government is not
statutorily barred from prosecuting Pendleton in another
district if it can show that a portion of his offense was
committed there. Moreover, the Constitution does not
“„command a single exclusive venue.‟” United States v.
Goldberg, 830 F.2d 459, 466 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting United
States v. Reed, 773 F.2d 477, 480 (2d Cir. 1985)). “„The
[c]onstitution requires only that the venue chosen be
determined from the nature of the crime charged as well as
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from the location of the act or acts constituting it, and that it
not be contrary to an explicit policy underlying venue law.‟”
Id. (quoting Reed, 773 F.2d at 480).
Where, as here, Congress has not designated the venue
in the relevant criminal statute, we employ the two-pronged
approach set forth in Rodriguez-Moreno. See 526 U.S. at
279. “A court must initially identify the conduct constituting
the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the
location of the commission of the criminal acts.” Id. To
identify which conduct “constitutes the offense,” we look to
Pendleton‟s crime of conviction, which provides:
Any United States citizen or alien admitted for
permanent residence who travels in foreign
commerce, and engages in any illicit sexual
conduct with another person shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than 30
years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2423(c). The crime of conviction thus comprises
three elements: (1) being a United States citizen or permanent
resident; (2) traveling in foreign commerce; and (3) engaging
in illicit sexual conduct. See Clark, 435 F.3d at 1105 (finding
that an American citizen who traveled in foreign commerce to
Cambodia and engaged in commercial sex acts with underage
boys could be prosecuted under § 2423(c)).
Of these three elements, we agree with the District
Court that “engaging in illicit sexual conduct” is the most
critical to § 2423(c). Indeed, the title of the offense—
“Engaging in Illicit Sexual Conduct in Foreign Places”—
describes only this conduct. Moreover, while travel in
foreign commerce is an element of § 2423(c), the crime itself
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is not complete until a person engages in illicit sex. In this
regard, § 2423(c) is unlike the crime of “[t]ravel with intent to
engage in illicit sexual conduct,” defined in § 2423(b), which
is complete as soon as one begins to travel with the intent to
engage in a sex act with a minor. See United States v.
Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 208, 210 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We find .
. . that the criminal act under § 2423(b) is foreign travel with
criminal intent; and thus, the offense is complete even if the
illicit intent is never realized.”). Although § 2423(c) targets
the same individuals as does § 2423(b)—namely, persons
traveling in commerce for the purpose of engaging in illicit
sex—it does so by focusing the court‟s attention on the
defendant‟s actual conduct in the foreign nation. See H.R.
REP. NO. 108-66, at 51 (explaining that Congress enacted §
2423(c) so “the government would only have to prove that the
defendant engaged in illicit sexual conduct with a minor
while in a foreign country.”). Thus, the locus delicti of §
2423(c) is the place where the illicit sex occurs, and not—as
is the case with § 2423(b)—where the intent to engage in the
illicit conduct is formed.
Because the crux of Pendleton‟s offense was
“committed . . . out of the jurisdiction of any . . . district,” the
District Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3238 was the controlling
venue provision. Section 3238 provides that an offense
“begun or committed” outside the United States “shall be
[prosecuted] in the district in which the offender . . . is
arrested.” Pendleton argues that § 3238 does not apply to him
because part of his offense occurred in the Eastern District of
New York and the title of § 3238 describes only those
“offenses not committed in any district.” Id. (emphasis
added). This argument has some persuasive force, as two of
our sister courts of appeals have held that “[s]ection 3238
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does not apply unless the offense was committed entirely on
the high seas or outside the United States.” United States v.
Pace, 314 F.3d 344, 351 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982); see also United States v.
Perlitz, 728 F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. Conn. 2010) (stating in dicta
that § 3238 cannot apply, “by its terms,” to a § 2423(c)
offense because “an essential conduct element” of the
offense, i.e., foreign travel, occurs within a district of the
United States).
On the other hand, the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have held that § 3238 applies even
when some of a defendant‟s offense conduct takes place in
the United States. See, e.g., United States v. Levy Auto Parts,
787 F.2d 946, 950-952 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 828
(1986) (finding venue proper under § 3238 when conspiracy
was “essentially foreign,” even when some overt acts
occurred inside the United States); United States v. Erwin,
602 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980) (“That venue may also be appropriate in another
district will not divest venue properly established under §
3238.”); see also United States v. Bin Laden, 146 F. Supp. 2d
373, 381 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (criticizing the Second
Circuit‟s narrow reading of § 3238 in Gilboe as “myopic” and
“directly in conflict with the clear language of the statute,”
and noting that the decision “has never been favorably cited
or relied upon” by district courts in the Second Circuit).
Although the title of § 3238 includes only “offenses
not committed in any district,” it is a “well-settled rule of
statutory interpretation that titles and section headings cannot
limit the plain meaning of statutory text where that text is
clear.” M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated Sch. Dist., 344
F.3d 335, 348 (3d Cir. 2003). Here, the plain language of §
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3238 supports the Fourth and Fifth Circuits‟ interpretation of
the statute. Section 3238 applies, by its terms, to any offense
“begun or committed” outside the United States. Pendleton
would have us read the term “committed” to mean “wholly
committed.” But this cannot be correct, because crimes that
are “wholly committed” outside the United States are, by
definition, “begun” abroad. For the term “committed” to
have independent meaning, it must refer to crimes that begin
inside the United States but that are in their essence
committed abroad. See Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d
137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen interpreting a statute,
courts should endeavor to give meaning to every word which
Congress used and therefore should avoid an interpretation
which renders an element of the language superfluous.”).
Here, although Pendleton‟s offense began when he
initiated foreign travel by boarding a plane bound for
Germany in the Eastern District of New York, he
“committed” the offense when he engaged in an illicit sex act
in Germany. Because Pendleton‟s criminal conduct was
“essentially foreign,” Levy Auto Parts, 787 F.2d at 950, the
District Court did not err in applying § 3238 to hold that
venue was proper in the district of arrest.
III
Having found that venue was proper in Delaware, we
turn to Pendleton‟s substantive claim, namely, his assertion
that the “noncommercial prong” of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) is
facially unconstitutional. Pendleton‟s constitutional claim is
subject to plenary review. United States v. Singletary, 268
F.3d 196, 199 (3d Cir. 2001). Because Pendleton raises a
facial challenge, we will invalidate the statute only if we find
“that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
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would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of
its applications.” Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has
noted that a facial challenge is the “most difficult challenge to
mount successfully.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,
745 (1987).
A
The Constitution authorizes Congress “to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3. In the early days of the Republic, the Supreme Court
defined “commerce” broadly to include “every species of
commercial intercourse” between two parties. Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 193-94 (1824). More recently, the
Supreme Court has recognized “three general categories of
regulation in which Congress is authorized to engage under
its commerce power.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5
(2005). These include: (1) the use of the channels of
interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and
(3) activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. In its pathmarking decision in
Lopez, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a statute
criminalizing the possession of a firearm in a school zone
because it did not fall within one of the three aforementioned
categories. Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the
Court struck down portions of the Violence Against Women
Act on similar grounds. 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“The
concern . . . that Congress might use the Commerce Clause to
completely obliterate the Constitution‟s distinction between
national and local authority seems well founded.”).
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The three-category framework outlined in Lopez and
Morrison applies, on its face, to statutes enacted pursuant to
the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court has yet
to determine whether this framework applies to cases
involving Congress‟s power to regulate pursuant to the
Foreign Commerce Clause. Early opinions of the Court
suggest that the three subparts of the Commerce Clause
should be interpreted similarly. Notably, in Gibbons v.
Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall suggested that “commerce, as
the word is used in the constitution, is a unit . . . [and] it must
carry the same meaning throughout the sentence, and remain
a unit, unless there be some plain intelligible cause which
alters it.” 22 U.S. at 194; see also Reno v. Bossier Parish
Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 329 (2000) (“refus[ing] to adopt a
construction that would attribute different meanings to the
same phrase in the same sentence, depending upon which
object it is modifying”); Saikrishna Prakash, Our Three
Commerce Clauses and the Presumption of Intrasentence
Uniformity, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1149, 1173 (2003) (“In practice,
we have three different Commerce Clauses when text and
history indicate that we ought to have but one.”).
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Marshall‟s statement in
Gibbons, the three subclauses of Article 1, § 8, cl. 3 have
acquired markedly different meanings over time. Whereas
the Interstate Commerce Clause has been constrained by state
sovereignty concerns, see, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615,
the Indian Commerce Clause has been interpreted so broadly
as to grant Congress “plenary and exclusive” authority to
regulate nearly every aspect of Indian life. United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (citing United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978)); see also Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989)
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(“While the Interstate Commerce Clause is concerned with
maintaining free trade among the States even in the absence
of implementing federal legislation, the central function of the
Indian Commerce Clause is to provide Congress with plenary
power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”).
The Foreign Commerce Clause likewise has “followed
its own distinct evolutionary path,” Clark, 435 F.3d at 1113,
having been used primarily as a tool to limit the ability of the
several states to intervene in matters affecting international
trade. See, e.g., Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
512 U.S. 298 (1994); Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); Antilles Cement Corp. v.
Acevedo Vila, 408 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 2005). For example, in
Japan Line, the Supreme Court held that California could not
impose an ad valorem tax on Japanese shipping containers
that were stored temporarily in the state because the scheme
could restrict the federal government‟s ability to “speak with
one voice” in foreign affairs. 441 U.S. at 448. Recognizing
that the purpose of the Foreign Commerce Clause was to
establish national uniformity over commerce with foreign
nations,4 the Court held that, “[a]lthough the Constitution,
4

Indeed, this was a principal reason for assembling the
Constitutional Convention of 1787. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 225
(Johnson, J., concurring) (quoting the preamble of James
Madison‟s draft resolution at the Virginia Ratifying
Convention, stating that “the relative situation of the United
States has been found, on trial, to require uniformity in their
commercial regulations, as the only effectual policy for
obtaining, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of
privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such
nations in the ports of the United States”); see also Michelin
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Art. I § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress power to regulate commerce
„with foreign Nations‟ and „among the several States‟ in
parallel phrases, there is evidence that the Founders intended
the scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”
Id.
Although jurisprudence on the so-called “dormant”
Foreign Commerce Clause is well-developed, “[c]ases
involving the reach of . . . congressional authority to regulate
our citizens‟ conduct abroad are few and far between.”
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1102. Courts have consistently held that
the Foreign Commerce Clause requires a jurisdictional nexus
“with” the United States, see, e.g., U.S. v. Weingarten, 632
F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2011) (stating that a person who travels from
one foreign nation to another to commit an illicit sex act may
not be punished pursuant to Congress‟s foreign commerce
power); Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1412 (9th Cir.
1983) (“The Federal Aviation Act does not apply to the
activities of a foreign carrier operating between two foreign
points without contact in the United States.”), but there is
precious little case law on how to establish the requisite link
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976) (“[A]
compelling reason for the calling of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 . . . was the fact that the Articles [of
Confederation] essentially left the individual States free to
burden commerce both among themselves and with foreign
countries very much as they pleased.”); United States v. The
William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 620 (D. Mass. 1808) (“It is well
understood, that the depressed state of American commerce,
and complete experience of the inefficiency of state
regulations, to apply a remedy, were among the great,
procuring causes of the federal constitution.”).
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to commercial interests in the United States. In the absence
of Supreme Court precedent on the issue, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that the Lopez
framework—which developed to “reconcile[] . . . the
conflicting claims of state and national power”—has little
analytical value in the Foreign Commerce Clause context.
Clark, 435 F.3d at 1118. Rather than applying Lopez‟s threepart framework to determine whether a statute has a
“constitutionally tenable nexus with foreign commerce,” the
Ninth Circuit proposed a “global, commonsense approach,”
which considers “whether the statute bears a rational
relationship to Congress‟s authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.”5 Id.
5

The Ninth Circuit in Clark claims to borrow this
“rational basis” test from the Supreme Court‟s holding in
Gonzales v. Raich. See 545 U.S. at 5 (holding that Congress
had a “rational basis” for believing that intrastate possession
and manufacture of marijuana had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce). As the dissent in Clark rightly notes,
however, the “rational basis” analysis in Raich went to
Congress‟s “substantial effects” determination. The Supreme
Court has articulated several factors to be weighed in
determining whether an activity “substantially affects”
interstate commerce: (1) whether the regulated activity is
economic in nature; (2) whether the statute contains an
“express jurisdictional element” linking its scope in some
way to interstate commerce; (3) whether Congress made
express findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity
on interstate commerce; and (4) attenuation of the link
between the regulated activity and interstate commerce. See
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12.
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The Government urges us to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
approach to the Foreign Commerce Clause. Although we
agree with Clark that the Interstate Commerce Clause
developed to address “unique federalism concerns” that are
absent in the foreign commerce context, we are hesitant to
dispose of Lopez‟s “time-tested” framework without further
guidance from the Supreme Court. See id. at 1119 (Ferguson,
J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has not yet held that
Congress has greater authority to regulate activity outside the
United States than it does within its borders; in fact, the
language used to describe its extraterritorial jurisdiction is
quite similar to that used in Lopez. See, e.g., Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 795 (1993) (recognizing
that the Sherman Antitrust Act applies extraterritorially, and
stating that a jurisdictional nexus exists when “foreign
conduct was meant to produce and did in fact produce some
substantial effect in the United States”). In any case, we need
not reach the fundamental question of whether the Supreme
Court will adopt the Ninth Circuit’s broad articulation of the
Foreign Commerce Clause because, as we shall explain, §
2423(c) is a valid congressional enactment under the
narrower standard articulated in Lopez.
The “rational basis” standard articulated by the Ninth
Circuit in Clark does not consider any of these factors.
Rather, its open-ended inquiry seems to borrow more heavily
from the Supreme Court‟s pre-Lopez jurisprudence, which
held that a court‟s “investigation . . . end[s]” once it
determines that “legislators . . . have a rational basis for
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the
protection of commerce.” Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294, 303-04 (1964).
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B
“[T]he authority of Congress to keep the channels of
interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has
been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question.”
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
256 (1964) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,
491 (1917)); see also Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612 (describing
the Court‟s holding in Lopez, and noting that that although 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) contains “no express jurisdictional element
which might limit its reach to a discrete set of firearm
possessions that additionally have an explicit connection with
or effect on interstate commerce, . . . [s]uch a jurisdictional
element [would have] establish[ed] that the enactment is in
pursuance of Congress‟s regulation of interstate commerce”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Unlike
Congressional authority to regulate activities affecting
interstate commerce under the third category in Lopez,
Congress‟s authority to regulate the channels of commerce is
not confined to regulations with an economic purpose or
impact. See, e.g., Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 491 (criminalizing
the interstate transportation of a woman or girl for
prostitution); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150
(1971) (banning the interstate shipment of kidnapped
persons); United States v. Cummings, 281 F.3d 1046, 1049-51
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that the International Parental
Kidnapping Crime Act regulates the channels of foreign
commerce by prohibiting the removal or retention of a child
outside the United States “with intent to obstruct the lawful
exercise of parental rights”).
In United States v. Tykarsky, we held that 18 U.S.C. §
2423(b), which criminalizes interstate travel with intent to
engage in illicit sexual conduct with a minor, is a valid
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exercise of Congress‟s power to regulate the channels of
commerce. 446 F.3d 458, 470 (3d Cir. 2006); accord United
States v. Hawkins, 513 F.3d 59, 61 (2d Cir. 2008) (per
curiam); United States v. Buttrick, 432 F.3d 373, 374 (1st Cir.
2005); Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 205-207. Pendleton attempts to
distinguish Tykarsky by noting that unlike § 2423(b), §
2423(c) includes no intent requirement. Citing United States
v. Rodia for the proposition that “[t]he mere presence of a
jurisdictional element . . . does not in and of itself insulate a
statute from judicial scrutiny under the Commerce Clause,”
Pendleton claims the District Court should have inquired
whether “the jurisdictional component in this case limits the
statute to items that have an explicit connection with, or effect
upon, [foreign] commerce.” 194 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding that 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)‟s jurisdictional
requirement that materials like film and cameras move in
interstate commerce “is only tenuously related to the ultimate
activity regulated: intrastate possession of child
pornography”). No such connection exists here, Pendleton
argues, because his conviction under § 2423(c) would stand
even if he traveled through the channels of commerce for an
entirely lawful purpose and only later formed the intent to
engage in illicit sex with a minor. Contrary to Pendleton‟s
assertions, however, a statute need not include an element of
mens rea to trigger the first prong of Lopez.
In United States v. Shenandoah, we upheld portions of
the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act
(SORNA), 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)(1) and (2) and 42 U.S.C. §
14072(i)(1), making it illegal for a sex offender to fail to
properly register after traveling in interstate commerce. 595
F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 2010); accord United States v. Ambert,
561 F.3d 1202, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. May,
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535 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir. 2008). Like the provision at issue
here (§ 2423(c)), SORNA does not require that a sex offender
intend, at the time of travel, to later violate federal
registration requirements. Nor does SORNA require the
Government to demonstrate a temporal connection between
the time of travel and a sex offender’s failure to register.
United States v. Husted, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 56662, at *9
(W.D. Okla. June 29, 2007) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-218
(Sept. 7, 2005)) (“[T]he legislative history of the statute
shows Congress chose not to incorporate a temporal
requirement but, instead, intended to encompass all sex
offenders.”). For instance, a “tier I sex offender” who moves
from one state to another and, years later, violates SORNA’s
provisions by failing to update his information on an annual
basis can be convicted under the statute. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250(a)(1); see Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2235
(2010) (observing in dicta that “[a] sequential reading [of the
statute] . . . helps to assure a nexus between a defendant’s
interstate travel and his failure to register as a sex offender”).6

6

In this respect, SORNA‟s “failure to register”
provision is similar to the federal felon-in-possession law, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), enacted pursuant to Congress‟s authority
under the Commerce Clause. Section 922(g) makes it
unlawful for a felon to “possess in or affecting commerce,
any firearm or ammunition . . . which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” In Singletary
v. United States, we held that the transport of a weapon
through the channels of interstate commerce—however
remote in the distant past—provides a sufficient jurisdictional
nexus to satisfy Lopez‟s first prong. 268 F.3d 196, 200 (3d
Cir. 2001) (citing Scarborough v. United States, 341 U.S.
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Nevertheless, SORNA was specifically enacted to
address “one of the biggest problems in our current sex
offender registry,” 152 CONG. REC. S8012-14 (daily ed. July
20, 2006), 2005 WL 2034118, namely, sex offenders who go
“missing” from the national registry by moving from one
state to another, H.R. REP. NO. 109-218(1) (2005), 2005 WL
2210642. Finding that “over 10,000 sex offenders, or nearly
one-fifth in the Nation . . . are „missing,‟” id., Congress chose
to regulate the behavior of all sex offenders who cross state
lines. Because Congress invoked its authority to regulate “the
use of interstate commerce to facilitate forms of immorality,”
Shenandoah, 95 F.3d at 161 (citing Brooks v. United States,
267 U.S. 432, 436 (1925)), it was not obliged to include an
express intent or temporal element in its definition of the
offense. Accord United States v. Dixon, 551 F.3d 578 (7th
Cir. 2008) (summarily rejecting defendant‟s Commerce
Clause argument, noting that the defendant “must in the heat
of argument have forgotten the Mann Act”); United States v.
Hann, 574 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (M.D. Tenn. 2008) (“[Lopez]
encompasses § 2250(a) because the statute regulates sex
offenders who travel in interstate commerce even though the
threat Congress was attempting to address—failure to register
as a sex offender—is an intrastate activity.”) (citations
omitted).
The same rationale applies to Pendleton‟s case. Just as
SORNA‟s “failure to report” provision was intended to
prevent convicted sex offenders from “us[ing] the channels of
interstate commerce in evading a State‟s reach,” Carr, 130 S.
563, 564 (1977)). Similarly, under § 2423(c), a person‟s
travel through foreign commerce continues to provide a link
to his illicit sexual conduct long after his travel is complete.
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Ct. at 2238, Congress enacted § 2423(c) to close “significant
loopholes in the law that persons who travel to foreign
countries seeking sex with children are currently using to
their advantage in order to avoid prosecution,” H.R. REP. NO.
107-525, at 3 (summarizing the purpose of adopting language
similar to § 2423(c) in the Sex Tourism Prohibition
Improvement Act).
Specifically, Congress found that
American citizens were using the channels of foreign
commerce to travel to countries where “dire poverty and . . .
lax enforcement” would allow them to “escape prosecution”
for their crimes of child sexual abuse. 148 CONG. REC. 3884;
id. at 3885 (“Sadly, we know that many Americans go abroad
to prey on young girls in other countries because laws
protecting women are very weak, non-existent, or not
enforced.”); H.R. REP. NO. 107-525, at 4 (“According to the
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, childsex tourism is a major component of the worldwide sexual
exploitation of children and is increasing. There are more
than 100 web sites devoted to promoting teenage commercial
sex in Asia alone.”); see also 109 H.R. 2012, 109th Cong. § 2
(2005) (“The United Nations estimates that sex trafficking,
including
sex
tourism,
generates
approximately
$5,000,000,000 a year in revenues. There are a number of
United States-based companies that overtly and explicitly
facilitate sex tours, often involving the sexual exploitation of
children. According to some estimates, up to 1/4 of
international sex tourists are American.”).
Members of Congress also expressed concern that §
2423(b) would not adequately deter child-sex tourists because
prosecutors were having an “extremely difficult” time
“proving intent in such cases.” 148 CONG. REC. 3884 (stating
that intent is particularly “difficult to prove without direct
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arrangement booked through obvious child sex-tour
networks.”). This, in turn, “creat[ed] a loophole in the law for
men who go abroad to have sex with minors, which in the
United States is considered statutory rape.” Id. Section
2423(c) was enacted to close the enforcement gap and to
“send a message to those who go to foreign countries to
exploit children that no one can abuse a child with impunity.”
Id. Thus, as it did with SORNA, Congress enacted § 2423(c)
to regulate persons who use the channels of commerce to
circumvent local laws that criminalize child abuse and
molestation. And just as Congress may cast a wide net to
stop sex offenders from traveling in interstate commerce to
evade state registration requirements, so too may it attempt to
prevent sex tourists from using the channels of foreign
commerce to abuse children. Id.; Clark, 435 F.3d at 1116
(“Congress legitimately exercises its authority to regulate the
channels of commerce where a crime committed on foreign
soil is necessarily tied to travel in foreign commerce, even
where the actual use of the channels has ceased.”); N. Am. Co.
v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (“Congress may impose
relevant conditions and requirements on those who use the
channels of interstate commerce in order that those channels
will not become the means of promoting or spreading evil,
whether of a physical, moral or economic nature.”).
In sum, because the jurisdictional element in § 2423(c)
has an “express connection” to the channels of foreign
commerce, Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612, we hold that it is a
valid exercise of Congress‟s power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause.7
7

Having found that the statute is constitutional under
the first prong of Lopez, we need not address Pendleton‟s
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IV
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District
Court‟s judgment of conviction and sentence.

contention that § 2423(f)(1) does not survive Morrison‟s
stringent “substantial effects” test. See United States v.
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[W]e need not
proceed to an analysis of Lopez‟s third category when
Congress clearly has the power to regulate such an activity
under the first two.”); United States v. May, 535 F.3d 912,
922 (8th Cir. 2008) (upholding SORNA under the first and
second prongs of Lopez, and thus finding that it “need not
address [the defendant‟s] contention SORNA was not
accompanied by findings that the activity in question exerted
a „substantial influence on interstate commerce‟ similar to
those in support of the Controlled Substances Act regulation
considered and upheld in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005)”).
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